social world (Billig, 1996; van Dijk, 1996a van Dijk, , 1998 . As will be suggested, if critical analysts fail to be self-reflexive then the critical enterprise can be compromised, to the extent that the critical limits of critique become ignored and thereby hidden.
Critical studies
The emergence of Critical Discourse Analysis has occurred at a time that coincides with the growth of other critical paradigms/theories/disciplines in the social sciences, such as 'critical psychology', 'critical social policy' and 'critical anthropology'. As has been mentioned, Critical Discourse Analysis initially had alternative labels such as 'critical language awareness' or 'critical language studies'. Fairclough (1992a) also used the label 'critical linguistics'. In this context, the term 'critical' can be seen to mark out a specific genre of academic studies and one can ask what implications are carried by this label.
There is a long history of academics describing their approach as 'critical'. Most notably, Kant, in the Preface of his great Critique of Pure Reason, described his work as constituting 'a Critical Investigation of Pure Reason' (Kant, 1781 (Kant, [1964 , p. 3). He explained his use of 'critical' by stressing that he was not referring to 'a criticism of books and systems', but to the analysis of reason which would be conducted by rational a priori principles 'without the aid of experience' (ibid., emphasis in the original). Despite Kant's disclaimer, the term 'critical' inevitably bears a rhetoric of criticism. This is because the formulation of an academic theory inevitably occurs in the context of argumentation, so that the propounding of a theory involves the explicit, and sometimes implicit, criticism of alternative theories (Billig, 1987) . Thus, Kant, who did not specifically argue with his philosophical opponents, nevertheless could not forbear in his Preface from casting aspersions on the 'dogmatists', who promise 'to extend knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience ' (1781 [1964] , p. 4). In this way, Kant was employing a rhetorical antithesis, contrasting his own critical philosophy with the uncritical dogmatism of others.
In this sort of context, the label 'critical' bears a rhetoric of self-praise, for it is invariably a term that is applied to the self. 'Uncritical' or 'non-critical' are reserved for others. No doubt the theorists who were judged to be 'uncritical' by Kant would not have happily accepted such a label. Nor would they have accepted the criterion that Kant proposed for distinguishing between the critical and the uncritical. Years after Kant, Karl Popper was to describe his own work as 'critical rationalism', claiming that metaphysicians, Marxists and those who believed in the principle of induction were all, in some way, uncritical dogmatists (Popper, 1976 ; see also Notturno, 1999) . Historically, the claim to be 'critical' has not been confined to philosophers. As Erica Burman (1996) points out, the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget, called his approach 'critical'. By this he meant that his psychology contained its own standards of validation and that rival approaches to which he was contrasting his own approach lacked such standards.
The critical approaches that emerged in the 1990s do not claim to be the inheritors of all previously self-labelled critical approaches. Critical discourse analysts do not tend to position themselves as Kantians or Popperians. As Burman (1996) makes plain, her own critical developmental psychology is very different from Piaget's. If the various recent critical paradigms/theories/disciplines do claim a common critical inheritance, then it tends to be from the 'critical theory' of the Frankfurt School. Kenneth Gergen, one of the most influential figures in the movement of critical psychology, sees his work and that of other critical psychologists as following the example of the Frankfurt School, despite advocating a very different sort of psychology than that used by Frankfurt School theorists. According to Gergen, today's critical psychologists share with the Frankfurt School a sense that academic work should aim to criticize existing conditions of social life in the hope of transcending those conditions (Gergen, 1994, p. 197ff .) .
More specifically, it is possible to identify several crucial features which the recent critical paradigms/theories/disciplines claim to possess and which gives particular meaning to the current use of 'critical'.
The first and most important factor is that critical approaches claim to be critical of the present social order. Van Dijk (1993) writes that the targets of Critical Discourse Analysis are power elites that sustain social inequality and injustice. Critical discourse analysts do not see themselves as conventional discourse analysts who happen to have radical or progressive views, as if social or political criticism were something additional to their academic work. Instead, Critical Discourse Analysis is seen to be a means of criticising the social order. This delineates today's critical studies from Kantian, Popperian or Piagetian critical study. Critical Discourse Analysis does not claim to be 'critical' because of a technical or methodological difference from other approaches to the study of language. It is claimed that Critical Discourse Analysis, like critical psychology or critical social policy, is critical because it is rooted in a radical critique of social relations.
Second, following from the commitment to radical critique, critical approaches position themselves as being critical of other academic approaches that are not primarily addressed to the critique of existing patterns of dominance and inequality. In particular, critical approaches contrast themselves with disciplines/paradigms/theories whose theoretical and methodological assumptions seem to exclude direct political or radical analyses. Fairclough writes that 'critical approaches differ from non-critical approaches in not just describing discursive practices, but also showing how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies ' (1992a, p. 12) . Critical discourse analysts are likely to view the approaches of both traditional linguistics and conversation analysis as being 'non-critical', because their perspectives seem to ignore the connections between language and power. Both such approaches focus on technical aspects of language so that the analytic tools are devoted to examining discrete pieces of language rather than placing these pieces in a wider political and social context (Wetherell, 1998) . For example, the conventional linguist might focus on details of grammar without seeking to link the occurrence of particular grammatical constructions within ideological practices and the maintenance of power relations (see, for instance, Widdowson's 1995 critique of critical approaches). Schegloff (1997) argues that the strength of conversation analysis lies in its refusal to impose political or other categories on the data of conversational interaction. The imposition of such categories, according to Schegloff, would obstruct the task of analysing the details of talk as they appear to participants. For critical analysts, the resulting focus is too narrow, for the wider political issues give way to detailed, technical analyses of interpersonal communication (Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1999) .
In such debates, the term 'critical' can become an object of contestation, for the supposedly 'non-critical' or 'uncritical' cannot be expected to accept the ascribed label without protest. Jonathan Potter, in a discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis, points out that CDA treats 'criticism as if it were intrinsic to the enterprise (and, implicitly, absent from other forms of discourse analysis) ' (1996, p. 227 ). Potter recommends types of discursive analysis which might or might not produce social criticism, depending on what emerges from the particular examination of particular pieces of discourse. The avowedly critical approaches take a different stance. For them, social critique is not something that may or may not result from analysis: it is the raison d'être for analysis. As such, the critical approach claims to have the aim of political critique inbuilt into its theoretical and methodological tools of analysis.
Third, critical approaches assert that academic work is related to the social conditions of domination. This assumption leads to a specific sort of critique that is directed against supposedly non-critical approaches. It is argued that non-critical approaches tend to constitute the dominant position within particular academic disciplines. Certainly, at present non-critical linguistics is much more widely practised and firmly established than Critical Discourse Analysis, and so is mainstream experimental psychology, as compared with critical psychology. Given that critical theorists see a link between academic work and social relations of domination, then the critique of mainstream, non-critical approaches takes on an extra edge. It is not merely argued that mainstream approaches fail to place their particular findings in a wider social context, but this gap is seen to be highly ideological. The mainstream approach, often by attacking the critical endeavour as 'politically biased' or 'non-rigorous', is said to preclude systematic social critique. This omission, according to critical theorists, is not innocent but has the function of maintaining existing power relations. Thus, the critical approach's critique of mainstream approaches cannot be confined to discussing technical questions of theory and methodology. Critical approaches not only seek to expose gaps in the supposedly non-critical orthodoxy but then seek to show how these gaps are neither neutral nor haphazard. According to critical discourse analysts, mainstream non-critical approaches to the study of language are themselves discourses whose ideological nature needs to be studied.
What this means is that the critical approach will view the existing discipline, which it is criticising, as being too narrow. Other forms of analysis, perhaps from other disciplines, need to be incorporated into the traditional disciplinary basis. Thus, critical discourse analysis implies that it is insufficient merely to study discourse as linguists have traditionally done. Linguistic analysis needs to be augmented by critical social analysis. Moreover, the tools of social analysis should be directed to studying conventional linguistics as a discipline. In this sense, the critical endeavours must go beyond the boundaries of the academic disciplines from which they emerge. Teachers of Critical Discourse Analysis or critical psychology will direct their students to read texts that seem to belong to other academic disciplines -to sociology, to social theory, to the history of ideas, and so on. The result is that the critical approach will appear to be interdisciplinary, since it cannot accept the disciplinary structure of the approach that it is criticizing.
Social context of academic work
The analysis of power relations, which is central for a critical approach, starts close to home. The critique of the non-critical paradigms is also typically an analysis of the power relations within the academic context, for the non-critical Other is assumed to constitute the mainstream dominant way of doing the discipline. In the case of critical psychology, the power relations are clear. In today's academic context, psychology has a complex, well-developed economy in Europe and North America. Large numbers of fee-paying students are to be trained each year; expensively funded research is booming; the discipline is part of a major publishing industry, as thousands upon thousands of textbooks, journals and academic books are issued each year. The vast bulk of this economy is devoted to mainstream, experimental-based psychology. By comparison, critical psychology -in terms of the personnel involved in production, the potential customers and economic turnover of the product -is a mere cottage industry.
It is at this point that claims about the success of a critical approach should start to raise problems. What does it mean to say that a critical discipline is establishing itself successfully? The opening statement by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) hints at the meaning of such success. They suggest that CDA is now being drawn upon by teachers and researchers across the social sciences and humanities. One might say, then, that CDA is entering the political economy of contemporary academic teaching and research. CDA specialists are being hired by universities. Fee-paying undergraduate students are enrolling in their courses. Postgraduates are being trained in CDA studies and seeking posts in universities. Publishers are issuing CDA books and journals, presumably doing so because of satisfactory profit margins. CDA researchers are attracting research grants, obtaining sponsorship for setting up specialist conferences, and so on. In short, the success of a critical subdiscipline such as CDA involves capturing some of the resources and markets occupied by the main discipline that is being criticized. The more successful the critical discipline, the more people will be professionally involved in its maintenance and the greater will be its economy.
Critical theorists seldom discuss these matters. It is easier and more comfortable to discuss critically the position of the mainstream -to point to its economy and its unbalanced relations of power. However, critical academics, by and large, operate in the same economic context as their supposedly noncritical colleagues. Fairclough (1995) has shown how the language of marketization is affecting documents such as prospectuses of job advertisements. It is possible to take the analysis two uncomfortable stages further. In the first step, one might wish to examine the rhetoric of product promotion within academic texts. This would involve examining how academics promote their own research wares, seeking to attract customers for their academic products. One might note the use of brand names. A conventional rhetoric encourages academics to package their products as part of a range issued by a theoretical perspective. The branding of the theory can be accomplished by the use of abbreviations. Rival theories are to be downgraded, as the academic seeks to attract customers (whether graduate students, research sponsors, potential collaborators or admiring readers) to their product. Thus, the unique selling point of the theory will be proclaimed.
Of course, the promotion of one's own academic product and the claiming of its academic advantages has always occurred. However, in the last 20 years the process seems to have become particularly marked, especially in relation to 'academic branding'. An example of this branding process can be given briefly. In social psychology, one of the major approaches to the study of intergroup relations goes under the heading of 'Social Identity Theory' and is conventionally abbreviated to 'SIT'. Social Identity Theory is explicitly derived from the work of Henri Tajfel, whose major book Human Groups and Social Categories was published in 1981. In that book Tajfel did not explicitly label his ideas as 'Social Identity Theory', let alone 'SIT'. Re-reading that work, and especially noting its title, one can see how little concerned Tajfel was with the branding of his ideas. A recent book introducing research in this area starts with the statement 'it is now 21 years since the first published statement of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) ' (Brown and Capozza, 2000, p. vii) . Yet the early statements by Tajfel did not present his ideas as 'social identity theory'. Even the introductory chapter of his edited book Social Identity and Intergroup Relations did not use the term, although some of the younger contributors were beginning to use it (Tajfel, 1982) . Today the label is easily available, as researchers today can identify their own particular investigations as belonging (or not belonging) to the established and well-tested brand of Social Identity Theory or its relaunched offshoot 'Self-Categorization Theory' (SCT).
1 In such ways, ideas are not themselves sufficient but become successfully marketed as branded and identifiable intellectual products in today's academic world.
The emergence of Critical Discourse Analysis needs to be placed in these growing trends towards academic marketization. In one sense Critical Discourse Analysis has been a response to such trends, as Norman Fairclough and others have turned their critical focus upon the language of academia. Yet, in a literal sense the emergence of 'CDA' has itself been a product of the spread of marketing discourse within academic institutions. To be sure, there have previously been radicals who have sought to analyse the linguistic details of dominant and dominating language. However, these ideas are now presented as coalescing into a distinct project that can be labelled 'Critical Discourse Analysis' or 'CDA'. As such, the critical ideas about language appear a product, a 'thing'. This has occurred at a precise time, when this type of rhetorical labelling is becoming common in academic work. This is not mentioned in order to downgrade the importance of critical approaches to the study of contemporary discourse. Quite the reverse, it follows from the assumption that a critical approach must seek to place the analysis of particular discursive formations in a wider social context, particularly an economic context. In this regard, it must be acknowledged that critical academic endeavours operate in the same broad economic context as uncritical approaches. If the context affects the nature of discourse, then one must expect critical and non-critical approaches to share common rhetorics. Certainly, critical texts tend to bear the hallmarks of conventional contemporary academic writing. A journal such as Discourse & Society, which specializes in critical studies of discourse, has similar publishing, refereeing and referencing styles to non-critical journals. Its format and style contains few, if any, overtly distinguishing features. It would be naive to think that the rhetorical processes of marketization, that might affect other aspects of the contemporary academic world, would somehow leave critical approaches untouched. However, the implications of the context, in which critical approaches operate, need to be assessed clearly. And this is one reason why, as Fairclough and others have stressed, critical approaches should be selfreflexive. If they are not, the limits of critique may be ignored.
Dilemmas of success
If the success of an endeavour such as Critical Discourse Analysis must occur within an academic context of power and economic relations, then this is not a matter of good or bad intentions by the critical analysts. However, it is all too easy for critical analysts, in their critiques of the mainstream Other, to ignore, or indeed wish away, this aspect of their endeavours. For example, there have been a number of discussions by critical social scientists about teaching critical approaches. Sometimes such writers talk about the necessity for creating the type of classroom discussions that enable students to enter discussions on terms of equality (see, for instance, McGuire's 2001 discussion of critical classroom practice, or Nightingale and Neiland's 1999 thoughtful account of the way that critical students and teachers can introduce the themes of critical psychology into their curricula). Typically such accounts contain a crucial omission. While they discuss how previously silenced voices might be empowered in the teaching of university courses, they do not address a central dilemma in the position of the critical university teacher.
The scope for egalitarianism is crucially limited and does not hinge upon the conduct of tutorial discussions.
2 University teachers not only operate within a system of inequality, but they also have key responsibilities for administering and thereby reproducing inequalities. Critical and non-critical teachers share in these responsibilities. Typically, university teachers are required to examine and grade the performance of students on their courses. This is expected by university employers, students and prospective employers of the students. Grading and examining involves both the operation of power and the necessity of discriminating between students in order to accomplish a record of inequality of performance. The accounts of critical pedagogy are typically silent about the exercise of power through grading students taking critical courses: it is as if social analysis gives way to the critical academic's protestations of good intentions.
Teachers of university courses in 'Critical Discourse Analysis' will have to engage in the practice of power that results in the grading of students. The more successful CDA is in establishing itself within the university curriculum, the more students will take CDA courses and the more critical analysts will be hired to teach and to grade these students. Success will bring more records of the unequal achievements in CDA. These records will be of use to prospective employers within and without the university sector. Thus, CDA teachers, who may be committed to egalitarianism, will find themselves professionally reproducing inequalities as a consequence of their professional commitments. Such is the dilemma of the professional critical analyst.
Dilemmas affect not only the teaching of a critical perspective, but also the establishment of the perspective as a research activity. As a critical paradigm establishes itself so it takes on many of the characteristics of an established discipline. It has its graded courses, textbooks and doctoral programmes. These courses, books and programmes will cite the texts of established critical writers in ways that promote some academics as 'leading figures', whose work is to respected and followed by the juniors. The discipline will also have its established journals, in which the young trained critical academics will compete to have their papers published. The result is that many young critical discourse analysts, and critical academics working in other subdisciplines, will be working in different circumstances from their teachers. Unlike those teachers they will not be struggling to break free of the disciplinary assumptions that they were taught. The young critical academics, by contrast, will find themselves working within a paradigm and its career structures. In short, success will bring a 'critical orthodoxy', which will have its own institutional and economic bases.
The question is whether this matters. Perhaps, it is inevitable that a sense of intellectual excitement must diminish as, to paraphrase Kuhn, revolutionary 'critical science' becomes normal 'critical science'. So one might envisage the pages of a critical journal such as Discourse & Society becoming filled with worthy pieces that make up for a missing creative excitement with technical proficiency as an already created paradigm is applied to an expanding range of problems.
3 Perhaps this is not something to worry about. One might justifiably talk of progress: the establishment of a critical paradigm, even as an intellectual orthodoxy, can be seen as an improvement of what came before and what goes on elsewhere. The critical academic may even point to a greater proportion of minority figures in established positions in the critical endeavours. The critical hierarchies, it might be suggested, are more permeable, although they still are hierarchies in a wider class system. Or, by contrast, one might worry that the growth of respectability entails the loss of critique as an intellectual creativity, especially if there is a lack of selfreflexive analysis or, worse still, if self-reflexive analyses systematically omit uncomfortable, but key, factors. In structural terms, the critical endeavour by its own success runs the risk of becoming a discipline with all that entails. It may have been liberating for early critical linguists to read outside their own disciplinary base and to turn this reading against the presuppositions of that base. However, what was once external is incorporated into critical courses of instruction. As courses in Critical Discourse Analysis are established, so radical works of social analysis that never were considered by conventional linguists to be part of linguistics become transformed into set texts for the next generation of students. Thus, the movement of success may be from a position that was interdisciplinary, even radically anti-disciplinary, to one that is itself disciplinary. This occurs because academic disciplines are social and institutional practices rather than inherent qualities of academic texts.
Maybe there is a need for continual intellectual revolution. If that is the case, then, perhaps critical discursive studies must be open to new forms of writing and to beware of its own linguistic orthodoxies. There may be a need to draw back from treating 'Critical Discourse Analysis' as if it were a recognizable product and to unpick the rhetoric that has lead from 'critical approaches' to the abbreviated and capitalized 'CDA'. Young academics should not seek to identify themselves with a defined way of doing academic research, but should see themselves as engaged in the critical analysis of discourse. The return of pronouns and the lower case to the description of that activity would itself carry a rhetorical message. Above all, there is a need to encourage young academics, especially those without established positions, to criticize the language and rhetoric of the established critical writers -even to expose the self-interest and political economy of the sign 'critical'. The results would not be comfortable for the critical experts; nor should they be if the activity of social critique is to continue into the future.
Notes
1. Condor (1996) acutely points out that Tajfel's ideas on social identity and intergroup relations do not actually have the formal properties of a theory. 2. In fact, the detailed discursive evidence of Edwards and Mercer (1987) suggests limitations to the equality and empowering that critical teachers might claim for their pedagogic methods. Analysing liberal teachers in junior schools, Edwards and Mercer showed how teachers subtly retain control over the classroom agenda, even when ostensibly seeking to impose knowledge on the pupils (see Billig et al., 1988 , for a discussion of the dilemmas facing teachers who claim not to be imposing discipline). There is little reason to suppose that detailed study of interaction in university settings would not provide analogous findings. 3. This is a problem about which the editor of Discourse & Society has repeatedly expressed concern. In a series of editorials he has warned against the journal becoming tied to a single established paradigm, which becomes established as a fixed way of doing critical analysis with a detrimental effect on succeeding generations of scholars (see, for instance, van Dijk, 1995 and 1996b) . The present chapter, in fact, began as a brief invited editorial for Discourse & Society (Billig, 2000) .
